Skip to main content

A Fair Witness

About 10 years ago, I was working with a client who were in the process of developing a new ecommerce website. The new website and servers were designed to replace an entire existing suite of systems, and provide a platform for the company's future expansion. As you might imagine, the project was sprawling, new front end servers, new middleware and a host of back-end business to business systems. The project had expanded during its course, as new areas of old functionality were identified and the business requested new systems to support new ventures.

This isn't an unusual scenario for software development projects, it is for exactly this type of situation that many companies now look to agile methodologies for help. But don't worry this isn't a rant about the benefits of one methodology over another. What interested me was the how the project team members performed and viewed their testing efforts.

Each build of the code would include new functionality, [hopefully] ready for testing. As the release date approached the rate of delivery would increase. More builds were delivered to the testers, in an effort to get more feedback, more quickly. As is normal, as we approached a deadline compromises were made. Programmers and testers would have their allotted time reduced. Programmers were given less time to program and unit test, and the testers less time for their own system testing.

The change in how the software and systems were developed was gradual. For a while things seem to continue on as before, maybe with a few more deadlines looking achievable. But once in a while there would be slip ups. For example, a bug may slip into the system, not have been uncovered during testing and have escaped into live. This situation would shocked the team, but luckily no serious damage was done. After-all bugs like this had occurred even when programmers and testers had been given more time, so who knows whether we 'would' of caught it before timelines were trimmed.

As features were 'completed' and the team moved on to new features, an interesting cognitive dissonance took place. Although a particular system was well known to of been coded in a hurry, and pushed live with only minimal testing, I noticed our views changed over time. Over time the dissonance appeared to cause us to assume we 'must of tested it properly' otherwise we wouldn't of released it. Despite at the time of release, every team member being quite uneasy with the release, due to its limited testing.

Another effect was the normalisation of risk, an accommodation we gained to the ever increasing levels of risk we were taking. As bugs were discovered in Production, or systems failed on the production network we gradually came to see these as 'everyday' occurrences. In a way this manner of thinking was 'correct', the bugs, outages and similar incidents were occurring more and more frequently, if not quite everyday.

This had a powerful affect on the testers. Initially they, like everyone involved, were alarmed at the bugs and outages. They gradually adapted to the new norm, Only more spectacular bugs surprised them and stood-out from the noise of the everyday failures. This environment had a detrimental affect on the ability of the testers to test effectively. While still highly skilled, the heuristics they were working with were getting more vague. For example at the start of the project, merely having not had a feature tested was grounds for heated discussion and probable release delay. It gradually became a question of whether any testing was needed for a new or modified feature.

Or for example, an error message in the logs, was originally always worthy of investigation. It was either a 'real bug' or at best 'correct code' mistakenly reporting errors. Either way it was worth reporting. But when several releases have gone out-the-door, and unfixed error messages are commonplace in the logs, do you report each one? How many were present in the last release? We accepted those errors, so are these important? Surely a failure is a failure, then and now?

What we can do as testers, is question the risk taking, the same as we question everything else. The change in behaviour is information in itself. Risk taking is part of a software testers job. We gamble time against coverage, in an effort to win bugs and new knowledge of the systems we test. When asked to reduce the testing time, maybe highlight how the risk of you missing bugs might change. You can suggest mitigations or conversely inform people of just what won't be tested. Are they comfortable with that?

When stakeholders are unhappy that you won't be testing something, that you missed a bug or just found a serious bug at the last minute, you could suggest that the teams risk taking is probably higher than everyone [including them] is comfortable with. If the testing was organised differently, ran for longer, or better resourced maybe the risk of those near misses could be reduced. The bug might be found half way through testing, given more time, new skills or a helping pair of hands.

As a fair witness of the events, software problems and risks affecting the project we are a valuable resource for gaining a view of a project's status and less an unwanted burden on project plans and deadlines.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Betting in Testing

“I’ve completed my testing of this feature, and I think it's ready to ship” “Are you willing to bet on that?” No, Don't worry, I’m not going to list various ways you could test the feature better or things you might have forgotten. Instead, I recommend you to ask yourself that question next time you believe you are finished.  Why? It might cause you to analyse your belief more critically. We arrive at a decision usually by means of a mixture of emotion, convention and reason. Considering the question of whether the feature and the app are good enough as a bet is likely to make you use a more evidence-based approach. Testing is gambling with your time to find information about the app. Why do I think I am done here? Would I bet money/reputation on it? I have a checklist stuck to one of my screens, that I read and contemplate when I get to this point. When you have considered the options, you may decide to check some more things or ship the app

Test Engineers, counsel for... all of the above!

Sometimes people discuss test engineers and QA as if they were a sort of police force, patrolling the streets of code looking for offences and offenders. While I can see the parallels, the investigation, checking the veracity of claims and a belief that we are making things safer. The simile soon falls down. But testers are not on the other side of the problem, we work alongside core developers, we often write code and follow all the same procedures (pull requests, planning, requirements analysis etc) they do. We also have the same goals, the delivery of working software that fulfills the team’s/company's goals and avoids harm. "A few good men" a great courtroom drama, all about finding the truth. Software quality, whatever that means for you and your company is helped by Test Engineers. Test Engineers approach the problem from another vantage point. We are the lawyers (& their investigators) in the court-room, sifting the evidence, questioning the facts and viewing t

XSS and Open Redirect on Telegraph.co.uk Authentication pages

I recently found a couple of security issues with the Telegraph.co.uk website. The site contained an Open redirect as well as an XSS vulnerability. These issues were in the authentication section of the website, https://auth.telegraph.co.uk/ . The flaws could provide an easy means to phish customer details and passwords from unsuspecting users. I informed the telegraph's technical management, as part of a responsible disclosure process. The telegraph management forwarded the issue report and thanked me the same day. (12th May 2014) The fix went live between the 11th and 14th of July, 2 months after the issue was reported. The details: The code served via auth.telegraph.co.uk appeared to have 2 vulnerabilities, an open redirect and a reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. Both types of vulnerabilty are in the OWASP Top 10 and can be used to manipulate and phish users of a website. As well has potentially hijack a user's session. Compromised URLs, that exp